Kevin Rotkiske v. Paul Klemm by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-15-2018 
Kevin Rotkiske v. Paul Klemm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Kevin Rotkiske v. Paul Klemm" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 368. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/368 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 PRECEDENTIAL 
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___________ 
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PAUL KLEMM, Esq., DBA Nudelman, Klemm &  
Golub, P.C., DBA Nudelman, Nudelman & Ziering, P.C.,  
 Klemm & Associates; NUDELMAN, KLEMM & GOLUB, 
P.C., DBA Nudelman, Nudelman & Ziering, P.C., DBA 
Klemm & Associates; NUDELMAN, NUDELMAN & 
ZIERING, P.C., DBA Nudelman, Klemm & Golub, P.C., 
Klemm & Associates; KLEMM & ASSOCIATES, DBA 
Nudelman, Klemm & Golub, P.C., Nudelman, Nudelman & 
Ziering, P.C.; JOHN DOES 1-10                                      
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-03638) 
District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
___________ 
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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to determine when the statute of 
limitations begins to run under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA or Act), 91 Stat. 874, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 
et seq. The Act states that “[a]n action to enforce any liability 
created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate 
United States district court . . . within one year from the date 
on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The 
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits have held that the time begins to run not when the 
violation occurs, but when it is discovered. See Lembach v. 
Bierman, 528 F. App’x 297 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); 
Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 
2009). We respectfully disagree. In our view, the Act says what 
it means and means what it says: the statute of limitations runs 
from “the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(d). 
I 
The relevant facts of this case are undisputed. Appellant 
Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 
and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates 
(Klemm) for collection. Klemm sued for payment in March 
2008 and attempted service at an address where Rotkiske no 
longer lived, but eventually withdrew its suit when it was 
unable to locate him. Klemm tried again in January 2009, 
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refiling its suit and attempting service at the same address.1 
Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, somebody at that residence 
accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default 
judgment for around $1,500. Rotkiske discovered the judgment 
when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014. 
 On June 29, 2015, Rotkiske sued Klemm and several 
associated individuals and entities asserting, inter alia, that the 
above-described collection efforts violated the FDCPA. 
Defendants moved to dismiss Rotkiske’s FDCPA claim as 
untimely and the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania agreed. The District Court rejected 
Rotkiske’s argument that the Act’s statute of limitations 
incorporates a discovery rule which “delays the beginning of a 
limitations period until the plaintiff knew of or should have 
known of his injury.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, No. 15-3638, 2016 
WL 1021140, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2016). It found the 
“actual statutory language” sufficiently clear that the clock 
began to run on Defendants’ “last opportunity to comply with 
the statute,” not upon Rotkiske’s discovery of the violation. Id. 
at *4. The Court also rejected Rotkiske’s request for equitable 
tolling as duplicative of his discovery rule argument. Id. at *5. 
 Rotkiske timely appealed the judgment of the District 
Court and a panel of this Court heard oral argument on January 
18, 2017. Prior to issuing an opinion and judgment, on 
                                                 
1 In a certification accompanying Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, Klemm’s managing partner stated that by the time of 
the second suit he had moved to a new firm named Nudelman, 
Nudelman & Ziering. Because Rotkiske has sued (among 
others) both Klemm and Nudelman, and the complaint’s 
allegations do not distinguish between them, for the sake of 
simplicity we refer only to Klemm.  
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September 7, 2017, the Court sua sponte ordered rehearing en 
banc, and argument was held on February 21, 2018.  
II2 
 “Statutory interpretation, as we always say, begins with 
the text.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016). The text 
at issue in this appeal reads: 
An action to enforce any liability created by this 
subchapter may be brought in any appropriate 
United States district court . . . within one year 
from the date on which the violation occurs. 
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (emphasis added). In declining 
Rotkiske’s request to read the statute to imply a discovery rule, 
the District Court found that this language spoke clearly. We 
agree, and will affirm its judgment dismissing Rotkiske’s 
untimely FDCPA claim.  
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
review of an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a 
claim is plenary, Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 
2005), as is our review of questions of statutory interpretation, 
United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2004). We 
will affirm an order dismissing a complaint only when the 
complaint fails to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
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 Statutes of limitation provide “security and stability to 
human affairs” and are “vital to the welfare of society.” Gabelli 
v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442, 448–49 (2013) (citations omitted). The 
standard rule is that a statute of limitations “commences when 
the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action.’” Bay 
Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar 
Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997) (quoting Rawlings v. 
Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941)). By fixing an end point for civil 
liability, Congress advances “the basic policies of all 
limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and 
certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a 
defendant’s potential liabilities.” Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 447–48 
(quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000)).  
 We recently summarized the two basic models that “a 
legislature may choose” in fixing the start of a limitations 
period. G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 
613 (3d Cir. 2015). First, a statute can run from “the date the 
injury actually occurred, an approach known as the ‘occurrence 
rule.’” Id. Alternatively, Congress may delay the start of the 
limitations period until “the date the aggrieved party knew or 
should have known of the injury, that is, the ‘discovery rule.’” 
Id. 
 Sometimes Congress clearly picks one model or 
another. When a statute of limitations begins to run only when 
“the plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual 
knowledge of the existence of such cause of action,” the 
discovery rule plainly applies. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(f)(2); Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 204 (interpreting 
29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(2) to impose a discovery rule); Merck & 
Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010) (interpreting similar 
language in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1)). Likewise, when Congress 
specifies that the “date on which the violation occurs” starts the 
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limitations period, the occurrence rule plainly applies. 
Accordingly, we hold that § 1692k(d)’s one-year limitations 
period begins to run when a would-be defendant violates the 
FDCPA, not when a potential plaintiff discovers or should 
have discovered the violation. 
 Congress does not, of course, always express statutes of 
limitations so directly. Instead of expressly enacting an 
occurrence or a discovery rule, Congress often articulates 
statutes of limitations in terms somewhere between those two 
poles. Some statutes of limitations begin when a “claim first 
accrue[s].” See, e.g., Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 447–48 (interpreting 
28 U.S.C. § 2462). Others start when the “cause of action 
arises” or when “liability arises.” See, e.g., McMahon v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) (interpreting Suits in Admiralty 
Act); Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201 (interpreting 29 
U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1)). And we have little doubt that an 
exhaustive search would yield still other variations—some 
subtle, some stark. This appeal does not implicate the less-
determinate language of those statutes, however. 
III 
 Despite the “occurrence” language of the FDCPA, 
Rotkiske insists that the discovery rule applies. His argument 
relies on the text of the FDCPA, the policies underlying the 
Act, decisions of two of our sister courts of appeals finding a 
discovery rule in the FDCPA, and decisions of this Court 
applying a discovery rule to other federal statutes. We consider 
each point in turn. 
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A 
 For starters, we reject summarily Rotkiske’s assertion 
that the text of the FDCPA is silent on the discovery rule. See 
Rotkiske Supp. Br. 6. While it is true that the Act does not state 
in haec verba that “the discovery rule shall not apply,” the 
Supreme Court made clear in TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 
19, 28 (2001), that Congress may “implicitly” provide as 
much. In that Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) case, the 
Court held that Congress had “implicitly excluded a general 
discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one.” 534 
U.S. at 28. The same natural reading applies to the FDCPA in 
this appeal: Congress’s explicit choice of an occurrence rule 
implicitly excludes a discovery rule. A quotidian example 
illustrates why this is so. When a bill states that payment is 
timely if it is “received at the bank by 5:00,” it goes without 
saying that a check arriving at 6:00 is late even if it was 
postmarked a week earlier. Short of the express command that 
TRW tells us is not required, it is hard to imagine how Congress 
could have more clearly foreclosed the discovery rule. 
B 
 Rotkiske also highlights the remedial purpose of the 
FDCPA, which was enacted to combat the national problem of 
abusive debt-collection practices. Rotkiske Supp. Br. 10–11. 
Rotkiske emphasizes that those practices may involve fraud, 
deception, or self-concealing behavior such that the failure to 
apply the discovery rule would thwart the principal purpose of 
the Act. Id. at 11–13. He warns that “[a]bsent the discovery 
rule, vulnerable consumers will be left without redress if the 
harm caused by debt collectors’ abusive or deceptive acts 
remains concealed for over a year.” Id. at 16. We disagree for 
two reasons. 
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 First, to the extent Rotkiske contends that the collection 
practices the FDCPA proscribes are inherently fraudulent, 
deceptive, or self-concealing, the statute belies his argument. 
Debtors are often vexed by overzealous or unscrupulous debt 
collectors precisely because of repetitive contacts by phone or 
mail. As the language of the FDCPA makes clear, many 
violations will be apparent to consumers the moment they 
occur. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (proscribing 
communication regarding debt collection “at any unusual time 
or place”); id. § 1692d (proscribing various forms of 
harassment in the service of debt collection, including “[t]he 
use of obscene or profane language” and “[t]he publication of 
a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts”); id. 
§ 1692f(7) (proscribing “[c]ommunicating with a consumer 
regarding a debt by post card”). The Act’s statute of limitations 
applies to all of its provisions, so we decline Rotkiske’s 
invitation to interpret the Act as if it contemplated only 
concealed or fraudulent conduct.3 
                                                 
3 The fact that the conduct proscribed by the FDCPA 
will usually be obvious to its victims distinguishes this case 
from our decision in Stephens v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 
2015). There, we considered a child sexual abuse claim 
governed by a statute that required a filing “within six years 
after the right of action first accrues.” 796 F.3d at 285 (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012)). We reasoned that since “child 
pornography is most often distributed in secret and without the 
victim’s immediate knowledge,” the statute’s fundamental 
objective of providing redress to exploited children would 
most often “be thwarted without the discovery rule.” Id. at 
285–86. 
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 Second, to the extent that FDCPA claims do deal with 
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s],” id. § 1692e, 
nothing in the Act impairs the discretion district courts possess 
to avoid patent unfairness in such cases. As we shall explain, 
equitable tolling remains available in appropriate cases. 
C 
 In addition to his textual and purposive arguments, 
Rotkiske asks us to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Mangum v. Action Collection Service, Inc., and the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Lembach v. Bierman, both of which 
implied a discovery rule in the Act’s statute of limitations. We 
respectfully decline to do so. 
 Most fundamentally, neither opinion analyzed the 
“violation occurs” language of the FDCPA. In Mangum, the 
Ninth Circuit did not engage the text of the Act, relying instead 
on its expansive holding in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence 
Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998), that “the 
discovery rule applies to statutes of limitations in federal 
litigation.” Mangum, 575 F.3d at 940. The Ninth Circuit did 
acknowledge that the Supreme Court had reversed its 
application of the Norman-Bloodsaw rule to the FCRA in 
TRW. Id. at 940–41. Nevertheless, after brushing aside TRW’s 
analysis as “food for thought . . . worth musing on,” id. at 941, 
the majority of the panel in Mangum concluded that TRW 
neither overruled nor undermined that circuit’s prior precedent 
regarding the general applicability of the discovery rule, id.4 
                                                 
4 Judge O’Scannlain disagreed, relying on essentially 
the same reading of the statutory text that we adopt here. 
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 Like the Ninth Circuit in Mangum, the Fourth Circuit in 
Lembach failed to engage the statutory text on its way to 
determining that a discovery rule would vindicate the policies 
underlying the FDCPA. Lembach, 528 F. App’x at 302. The 
Court reasoned—without mentioning equitable tolling—that 
because plaintiffs “had no way of discovering the alleged 
violation,” the defendant “should not be allowed to profit from 
the statute of limitations when its wrongful acts have been 
concealed.” Id. For these reasons, we decline to join either the 
Ninth or the Fourth Circuits in holding that the statute means 
something other than what it plainly says. 
D 
 In addition to the opinions of our sister courts in 
Mangum and Lembach, Rotkiske places substantial weight on 
our opinion in Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 
38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994). In dictum in that case, we applied 
the discovery rule to Title VII, even though the statutory 
language required charges to be filed within 180 days “after the 
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–5(e). 
 The problem with Rotkiske’s reliance on Oshiver is that 
its dictum is in obvious tension with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in TRW. Instead of focusing on the statutory text 
(which we relegated to a footnote, 38 F.3d at 1385 n.3), we 
described a “general rule” that “the statute of limitations begins 
to run . . . [on] the date on which the plaintiff discovers” an 
injury rather than “the date on which the wrong that injures the 
plaintiff occurs,” id. at 1385 (emphasis in original). The 
                                                 
Mangum, 575 F.3d at 944 (O’Scannlain, J., specially 
concurring). 
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Supreme Court’s approach in TRW counsels in favor of 
reconsidering our earlier practice of presuming that federal 
statutes of limitations include an implied discovery rule. 
Indeed, to the extent that our decisions have relied on such a 
general presumption in applying a discovery rule to statutes 
that expressly begin to run when a violation “occurs,” they 
cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s mandate that 
when “the text [of a statute] and reasonable inferences from it 
give a clear answer,” that is “the end of the matter.” Brown v. 
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (citations omitted). See 
Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1385 (presuming applicability of discovery 
rule); Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 590 (3d Cir. 
2005) (same, following Oshiver).  
 Rather than imply a discovery rule by rote “in the 
absence of a contrary directive from Congress,” see, e.g., 
Disabled in Action of Pa. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 
199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), we must parse each limitations period 
using ordinary principles of statutory analysis—beginning 
with the statutory text and then proceeding to consider its 
structure and context. See, e.g., TRW, 534 U.S. at 28–33. As 
part of that inquiry into context, it may sometimes prove 
appropriate to consider whether there are “historical[] or 
equitable reasons” to adopt either an occurrence or a discovery 
rule. Gabelli, 568 U.S at 454. See, e.g., TRW, 534 U.S. at 27–
28 (noting that latent disease and medical malpractice, but not 
the FCRA, are contexts that “cr[y] out for application of a 
discovery rule”); Stephens v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281, 285–88 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (noting the secretive nature of trade in child 
pornography and the likelihood that an occurrence rule would 
frustrate Congress’s objective to provide a remedy to 
blameless minor victims). This is not such a case, however, 
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because the text of § 1692k(d) plainly incorporates an 
occurrence rule.  
IV 
 We conclude by emphasizing that our holding today 
does nothing to undermine the doctrine of equitable tolling. 
Indeed, we have already recognized the availability of 
equitable tolling for civil suits alleging an FDCPA violation. 
See Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(considering and rejecting an equitable tolling argument where 
no extraordinary barrier existed to plaintiff’s suit). We do not 
reach the question in this case only because Rotkiske failed to 
raise it on appeal. Accordingly, our opinion should not be read 
to foreclose the possibility that equitable tolling might apply to 
FDCPA violations that involve fraudulent, misleading, or self-
concealing conduct. See, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) 342, 348 (1874) (“[W]here the party injured by the fraud 
remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of 
diligence or care on his part, the bar . . . does not begin to run 
until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special 
circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the 
fraud to conceal it . . . .”).5 
                                                 
5 If Rotkiske had preserved reliance on equitable tolling 
on appeal, then Judges McKee, Ambro, Vanaskie, and Shwartz 
would have remanded to allow the District Court to consider 
whether he would be entitled to rely on this doctrine because 
our precedent had not previously recognized that a defendant’s 
self-concealing conduct may be a basis for equitable tolling. 
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V 
 Civil actions alleging violations of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act must be filed within one year from the 
date of the violation. Because Rotkiske’s action was filed well 
after that period expired, his action was untimely. We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
